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ABSTRACT 
This study was designed to review the proposals for road user charging in the Randstad, 
Stockholm, Oslo and Singapore, to determine the intentions for monitoring of each of 
these proposed schemes, to assess the implications for the development of policy in 
London, and to identify any opportunities for obtaining experience which would help in 
clarifying the uncertainties associated with proposals for road pricing in London. 
The study reviewed the objectives and operational requirements for road pricing in 
London and the criticisms levelled against such proposals. On this basis it developed a 
series of requirements for monitoring and information gathering to help clarify the 
outstanding uncertainties. These were used as a check list for a series of discussions with 
those responsible for proposals in the case study cities. 
Discussions indicated that the proposals in most cities had changed markedly in the 
period since the study was commissioned. These changes, and the resulting nature of the 
proposals, meant that only the proposals for Stockholm were sufficiently similar to those 
in London to justify collaborative monitoring. The report recommends that such 
collaboration be developed. However, both the Randstad and Oslo schemes offer the 
opportunity for obtaining information on actual or predicted user response, while the 
Singapore proposals will provide valuable experience of new technology. It is 
recommended that all of these are pursued. 
The discussions highlighted several lessons of direct relevance to the development of 
policy in London. In particular i t  is seen as important to keep the specification of the 
measures simple; to pursue extensive consultation with those who might be affected. and 
with all and government bodies who might be involvedin policy decisions; 
to provide clear guidance on the anticipated uses of the revenue: and to develo~ a svstem 
which is implemented flexibly, so that' problems can be remedied as  they arise. 
' 
In this context, the role of assessment and monitoring is limited. It  should not be used to 
delay decisions; however, once a commitment is made to proceed, experience &om 
elsewhere will be of value in informing the consultations. A carefully designed monitoring 
programme will be important in assessing and enhancing a scheme once implemented. It  
is recommended that the monitoring programme should be based on the requirements 
identified in this report. 
1 STUDY OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE 
1.1 Objectives 
Several organisations, including LPAC, have proposed that road pricing be implemented 
in London as an element in a wider transport strategy. This proposal has generated some 
doubts, notably from the Department of Transport (DTp), about issues such as the area 
over which road pricing would be required, the likely level of price sensitivity, the equity 
aspects of the charging system particularly adjacent to charging boundaries, and the 
feasibility of enforcement. 
Several other cities are considering implementing road pricing and, were they to do so, 
i t  should ideally be possible to help to resolve these doubts by careful monitoring of the 
schemes as introduced. The current study was designed to determine the feasibility of 
using the results from monitoring of other road pricing schemes as a means of clarifying 
policy in London. The schemes on which the study has been based are:- 
(i) the proposals for road pricing in the Randstad; 
(ii) the proposal for supplementary licensing in Stockholm; 
(iii) the pricing cordon already implemented in Oslo (where, obviously, no new 
before data could be collected); 
(iv) the proposed conversion of area licensing to road pricing in Singapore. 
The objectives of the study were therefore:- 
(i) to review progress on proposals for road pricing and other forms of traffic 
restraint in other countries; 
(ii) to determine the intentions for monitoring of each of these proposed 
schemes; 
(iii) to assess the implications for the development of transport policy in London 
and, specifically, to identify any additional monitoring requirements which 
would helv to clarify uncertainties associated with the debate over road 
pricing in London. 
1.2 Study Method 
The study was conducted in four stages:. 
(1) An assessment of the objectives and criteria against which a road pricing 
scheme would need to be assessed in London, and the resulting data 
requirements. 
This initial assessment was based on experience with earlier work for LPAC, and 
on previous studies of traffic restraint policies in London and elsewhere. It  
resulted in a brief report to the client which, once approved, formed the basis for 
Stages 3 and 4. 
(2) A desk review of the current state of development of proposals in the 
selected cities. 
This work was conducted in parallel with Stage 1 and during the period in which 
the Stage 1 report was being assessed. It was based largely on existing reports, 
reinforced by correspondence with those concerned. 
(3) Visits to  the selected cities. 
Visits were then arranged to appropriate contacts in each of the cities to update 
the review in Stage 2, to obtain details of current and proposed monitoring 
proposals, and to assess these against the data requirements developed in Stage 
1. Where gaps were identified, the feasibility of using local resources to fill them 
were discussed. The opportunity was also taken to review current plans for 
implementation, dealing with such issues as public acceptability, enforcement, 
provision of alternatives to car use, and integration with other policies. 
(4) A review of the implications for London, and recommendations. 
This stage, which summarised the findings of Stages 2 and 3, was designed to 
identify any new issues of potential concern to London, advise on any immediately 
resulting policy implications for London, assess the extent to which the results of 
monitoring exercises in the selected cities would assist in determining policy in 
London, and make recommendations for any additional monitoring which appeared 
to be needed, and the basis on which this could be financed and conducted. 
1.3 Structure of the  Report 
The remainder of this report follows the sequence outlined above. Section 2 summarises 
the main information sources used. Section 3 outlines the objectives and criteria 
identified for the assessment of road pricing in London, and hence for the discussions on 
opportunities for monitoring in each of the case study cities. Sections 4 to 7 report in turn 
on each of the cities visited. Section 8 draws conclusions and recommendations. 
Each of the four city reports is structured to cover, in turn:- 
. a brief history of the proposal and its current status; 
. the objectives of the scheme as currently proposed; 
. any proposals for monitoring, and the extent to which these might assist in 
answering outstanding questions in London; 
. a summary of the opportunities for monitoring, and of other issues which 
have arisen which are relevant to road pricing in London. 
2 INFORMATION SOURCES 
2.1 Studies of Road Pricing i n  London 
The initial review of objectives and criteria was based on several studies for London, listed 
below. 
(i) Studies for LPAC. The most recent studies for London are the series conducted 
for LPAC, which have included: 
(a) an analysis, using the London Area Model, of a range of transport 
strategies, which indicated the importance of traffic restraint as an element 
in any transport strategy for London - TASTE I (May et al, 1988; LPAC, 
1988; May and Gardner, 1990); 
(b) a desk study of alternative options for traffic restraint which argued that 
cordon-based electronic road pricing represented the most promising means 
of imposing restraint - TASTE I1 (May and Gardner, 1989; LPAC, 1989); 
(c) a study, using the LTS model, of the performance of a number of strategies, 
including two which involved traffic restraint - TASTE I11 (May, Guest and 
Gardner, 1990;LPAC, 1990). 
(ii) Assessment Studies. The series of four assessment studies for the DTp, 
investigating solutions to problems in four separate sectors of London, purported 
to investigate traffic restraint, but i t  is clear that in practice the assessment was 
rudimentary. However, the objectives against which the studies were conducted 
may be relevant. They are outlined in LPAC (1990). 
(iii) Studies for the GLC. The GLC, in the 1970's, conducted three relevant studies:- 
(a) the supplementary licensing study (GLC, 1974; May, 1975a) which assessed 
a range of options in which prepaid licences were required in order to use 
vehicles in specified areas; 
(b) a review of options for the control of private non-residential parking (May, 
1975b; GLC, 1976; DOE, 1976) which developed a number of proposals for 
restricting the use of PNR parking; 
(c) the area control study (Prestwood-Smith, 1979; GLC, 1979) which 
considered an alternative approach to the allocation of permits and pre-paid 
licences. 
2.2 Reviews of Road Pricing Policy 
In addition, use was made of a series of more general reviews of policy on road pricing, 
in particular:- 
(i) the IPPR study: A Cleaner, Faster, London (IPPR, 1989) to which the Institute for 
Transport Studies contributed (Mackie and May, 1989); 
(ii) the ICE study on congestion (ICE, 1989) which argued strongly that road pricing 
was needed; 
(iii) the CIT study: Paying for Progress (CIT, 1990), which investigates specifically the 
role of road pricing; 
(iv) a report for the London Boroughs Association (LBA, 1990); 
e 
- 
(v) a review of the performance of alternative restraint mechanisms (May, 1986); 
(vi) an assessment of road user charging for ECMT (Goodwin and Jones, 1989). 
In addition the outcome of some recent reviews of public attitudes to restraint has been 
considered, including work by Jones for DTp, by MVA for the London Borough of 
Richmond, and by MTRU for five West London Boroughs and for LPAC and several North 
Eastern London Boroughs (Jones, 1990; MTRU, 1989,1990). 
2.3 Information on Case Study Cities 
In advance of the actual visits, information on the proposals in each of the selected cities 
was obtained from three sources:- 
(1) proposals, marketing information and reviews generated by the responsible 
authorities and their agents in each of the cities; 
(2) more recent papers by those involved with the schemes, and the critical reviews 
of other interested parties; 
(3) direct conversations and correspondence with those involved with the schemes. 
For the Randstad, the main sources were the proposals under the Second Transport 
Structure Plan (Ministrie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1988a), further specification of the 
intentions for road pricing (Ministrie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1988b; Klijnhout et al, 
1988) and a recent technical description of the intended system (Stoelhorst and 
Zandbergen, 1990). 
For Stockholm, we had access to the report to the Swedish Ministry of Transport on traffic 
policy for Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo (Peterson, 1990), while for Oslo, papers were 
available describing the Oslo scheme and future plans for it (Larsen, 1990), together with 
information on its precursor in Bergen (Larsen, 1988). 
The existing area licensing scheme in Singapore is much more fully documented, with a 
detailed review of its early performance by the World Bank (Watson and Holland, 1976; 
World Bank, 1976; Holland and Watson, 1978) and others (McGlynn and Roberts, 
1977a,b), a later assessment of its distributional impact (Wilson, 1988) and a summary 
of recent changes and future proposals (Laconte, 1990). 
2.4 Additional Information on  Cambridge 
During the study, information was also made available on proposals for congestion pricing 
in Cambridge. While the stage of development of the Cambridge proposals made it 
inappropriate to consider them as providing an opportunity for monitoring, the proposals 
raise some issues of relevance for London, and are summarised here. 
---  
Cambridge has experience a 47% growth in traffic over the past ten years. 
Cambridgeshire County Council has estimated that, unchecked, trafiic growth in 
Cambridge in the next decade will rise by a further 37% to 59%. This is mainly due to 
the high rate of GDP growth in the region and a large expansion in housing in urban 
areas. The stated aim of the road pricing scheme planned for Cambridge is to restrict the 
level of traffic to 1990 levels. 
The proposed road pricing system is based upon a smart card system similar to that 
- 
- 
considered in the Randstad, but with a simpler mode of operation. Each car in the area 
will be provided with a meter which would be switched on automatically as the vehicle 
enters (and off as the vehicle leaves) Cambridge by a set of beacons around the perimeter 
of the city. The meter will operate by deducting units from a pre-paid card whenever the 
driver encounters congestion in the city, identified by the meter as a stop-start pattern 
of movement. Oldridge (1990) estimates that in 1995 a 5 km peak-hour urban journey 
will use between 4 and 8 units. Daily tickets will be available to other drivers a t  slightly 
above this rate. 
Cambridgeshire County Council, in line with Singapore and the Randstad, have elected 
to set an acceptable level of congestion and to alter the charge to achieve this. I t  is hoped 
that the development of a light rail route, paid for in part from the proceeds of the road 
scheme, may provide an alternative travel mode to many commuters. 

3 OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT 
3.1 Approach Adopted 
Three separate bases were developed for determining the objectives and criteria against 
which the performance of road pricing strategies should be assessed. The first involved 
identifying the policy objectives against which transport strategies involving road pricing 
have been developed. The second considered the operational requirements identified in 
such studies. The third reviewed the objections which have been levelled against road 
pricing as a strategy. There'is inevitably some overlap between these lists. The main 
concern in the study must be with the last of these sources, since the aim is to identify 
information sources which can be used to assess the validity of the objections. 
3.2 Policy Objectives 
These have largely been based on concerns over:- 
Economic growth and revitalisation in terms of improving the attractiveness of an 
area for investment; 
Efficiencv in the use of resources and relief of traffic congestion; 
Accessibilitv in terms of time, or generalised cost, for journeys by different modes 
to different activities; 
Environmental urotection and improved oualitv of travel, particularly reduction of 
noise, pollution and pedestrian delay and reduced stress for drivers; 
Revenue generation to finance public transport or highway improvements; 
Safetv in terms of reduction in the number of accidents; 
in terms of distribution of accessibility and environmental effects; 
Practicability in terms of how well the public understand the purpose of traffic 
restraint and its responsiveness to new circumstances; 
Sustainabilitv in terms of reducing energy and resource consumption to levels 
which match the rate of substitution by other energy sources and resources; 
Acceutabilitv in terms of whether the public perceive the need for restraint. 
It is arguedin (May, 1986) that efficiency andenvironmental protection are the objectives 
for which restraint is most clearly justified. 
It is worth noting that most studies have advocated traffic restraint as one element in a 
package of measures designed to achieve these objectives; thus the effects of restraint may 
be difficult to assess on their own without considering the contribution of rail investment. 
- 
bus priorities, traffic management or traffic calming. 
3.3 Operational Criteria 
The operational requirements identified in the GLC Supplementary Licensing study (GLC, 
1974) have been used in (May, 1986) to review a range of traffic restraint methods. They 
suggest that any restraint method should be:- 
Effective in reducing congestion andlor environmental intrusion; this in turn 
implies that it must bear on all, or at least a substantial majority, of those 
journeys which contribute to these problems, and do so in such a way as to induce 
a significant 1-esponse; 
Flexible in its operation, enabling the restraint effect to be intensified or modified 
as necessary; 
Selective in its impact, enabling it to bear most heavily on those who impose 
greatest cost, and to encourage them to make alternative decisions; 
Simple from the point of view both of the user and the operator; 
Contained in  its effects, so that congestion and environmental intrusion are not 
simply transferred in time or space. 
Other requirements identified in the literature include the need to be:- 
Enforceable in being able to detect evaders accurately and recover outstanding 
payments; 
Reliable in its operations in terms of speed and accuracy of debiting and trouble 
free performance; 
Robust in terms of equipment being able to withstand vandalism or tampering and 
extremes of weather and traffic conditions; 
Attractive in terms of its design and appearance; 
Transparent in terms of making charges known to people prior to and while 
travelling. 
3.4 Objections to Traffic Restraint 
The main objections identified can be classified as follows:- 
(i) restraint would be ineffective; ie, in the case of mad pricing, either the response 
to price would be too low, or the reduction in traffic, fmm those who did respond, 
would be offset by a growth in other tr&c unless the initial charges were 
sufficiently high to shock individual travellers and lead to significant changes in 
travel behaviour; 
(ii) restraint would simply transfer the problem to other locations, or times of day; 
particular concerns are the growth of orbital traffic and congestion outside the high 
charge periods which could lead to rat-running in new areas; 
(iii) restraint would create new ~roblems such as parking on the fringes of charging 
points and ploys to evade or avoid payment; 
(iv) restraint wouldimpose undue burdens on public transport, since there is perceived 
to be insufficient capacity on bus and train services which in turn could lead to 
longer wait times, aueues and overcrowded travelling conditions: 
- - 
(v) restraint would be administratively impractical; this has bken a criticism 
~articularlv of licence and permit-based svstems, and is ~robablv not valid for 
- " A " 
electronic mad pricing; however, there is a question over the feasibility of 
equipping all vehicles in the area affected; 
(vi) restraint would be administrativelv complex and expensive both in terms of the 
institutional arrangements required set up and operate the system, the 
collection and distribution of revenues and dealing with complaints and claims for 
- 
concessions and exemptions; 
(vii) restraint would be difficult to enforce; that is violations could not be detected, or 
there would be too many to be effectively processed; 
(viii) restraint would be unfair; this is perhaps the widest ranging criticism, and 
includes concerns over income-related inequities, the impact of car use subsidies, 
the effects on people with particular needs (eg disabled drivers; service engineers) 
and the boundary effects near to pricing cordons or to temporal changes in 
.. . 
charging level; 
(ix) restraint would be an infringement of arivacv; this i6 a particular concern with 
electronic systems based on automatic vehicle identification (AVI) which can trace 
individual vehicles; 
(x) restraint would contravene a freedom to use aublic roads; 
(xi) restraint would induce longer tenn relocation of land use, and hence potentidy 
exacerbate transport pi-oblems; the most noticeable and immediate effects are 
expected to be in retail distribution, retail centres and the office based employment 
sector. 
3.5 Resulting Monitoring Requirements 
In the light of this review, the following information requirements were identified for the 
assessment of road pricing in London. This checklist was agreed with LPAC officers and 
used as a basis for assessing the potential contribution of monitoring plans in the case 
study cities. 
(a) The scale of traveller response 
This can be considel-ed in terms of changes for individual travellers in:- 
- the amount of travel 
- the origin and destination of travel 
- the time of travel 
- the mode used 
- number and composition of vehicle occupants 
- the route used 
- the time spent at the destination 
- the parking location. 
(b) General public and media attitude/aerception 
This could be assessed on the basis of reactions by:- 
- motorists affected 
- other motorists 
- public transport users 
- pedestrians and cyclists 
- freight operators 
These will need to be considered for:- 
- different groups of user 
- different trip purposes 
- different trip locations. 
In addition, the views of residents and commercial activities, and more general 
reactions of the media will be relevant. 
(c) The scale of emalovers' response 
This can be considered in terms of a number of possible changes introduced by 
employers to offset individuals' costs:- 
- changes in tax allowances 
- direct payment for employees' costs 
- changes in flexi-time, work from home arrangements 
- change of location 
- changes in work practices; eg fewer business trips. 
(d) The scale of freight operators' resuonse 
Many of these responses will be the same as for other travellers but need to be 
considered as a separate category as time savings for freight operators are 
particularly valuable; the following changes are likely to be significant: 
- time of travel 
- amount of travel 
- route used. 
(e) The scale of land-use response 
This will to an extent influence the level, origin and destination of travel in (a); 
however, the effect will be a longer term one, and hence more difficult to 
determine; land-use effects need to be examined separately for retail, business, 
industrial and housing sectors. 
(0 The svstems implications of (a) and, in the longer term, (e); this will concern the 
level of transfer of congestion, overloading on public transport, environmental, 
safety and accessibility impacts. These will to a considerable extent depend upon 
the characteristics of the city and its transport system, as well as on how the 
benefits of restraint are used; and what other measures (eg public transport 
investment) accompany road pricing. Criteria which will be particularly important 
to monitor, for different areas and times of day, are:- 
- average journey speeds 
- total travel times (door to door and link based) 
- wait/delay times 
- probabilities of getting a seat, getting aboard 
- total vehicle kilometres 
- total person kilometres by mode. 
(g) The equitv imalications 
These will depend on the responses in (a), and the resulting changes in costs, as 
a result of (e); they will thus in part depend on local characteristics, and the way 
in which restraint is applied, and the benefits and revenues used. These in turn 
will depend on the precise charging structures introduced and location of debiting 
points. 
(h) The practical considerations 
In particular these will concern the ways in which the system is introduced, 
perceived, administered and enforced. This will be affected by the charging 
structure and distribution of debiting points but also by the level and quality of 
information explaining the system and its outputs. 
(i) Implications for the environment 
A number of changes in environmental conditions will be implied by changes in 
total vehicle kilometres, traffic composition and speed. However it will be 
necessary to make separate assessments of a number of environmental attributes, 
in particular:- 
- air pollution 
- noise levels 
- pedestrian delay 
- severance. 

4 THE RANDSTAD 
4.1 History and  Current Status 
In response to a projected 72% increase in car kilometres travelled in the Randstad area 
between 1986 and 2010 and a 300% rise in congestion costs, the Dutch Ministry of 
Transport and Public Works launched a three-pronged attack on congestion comprising 
road widening and the removal of bottlenecks, extensions to public transport and 
electronic road pricing on all inter-urban roads, "Rekening Rijden". All of these are 
subsumed under the Second Transport Structure Plan (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 1988a). 
The original proposal for road-pricing envisaged an increase in the variable cost of 
motoring of 50%. The revenue was intended to cover the cost of operating the system, 
meet the interest and repayment charges on privately funded tunnels, improve public 
transport and influence land use and worWhome interractions. The original proposals 
envisaged charging points every lOkm based upon peak hour charges of £1 and off-peak 
charges of lop per charging point. The motorist would know in advance what the actual 
charges would be. The road pricing system proposed for the Randstad was to have been 
based on development in SMART card technology, high speed data transmission using 
infra-red or microwave communications and encryption technology. The card is given 
value by inserting it  with a form of payment, a t  a filling point. The card is then inserted 
into a unit in the car. 
The Dutch plan was by far the most comprehensive of those envisaged to date and were 
it  to go ahead would be the most technologically advanced of the systems. It was proposed 
that the road pricing system should be based on state of the art smart card technology 
and allow for different charging rates depending on travel time, route, direction, and 
vehicle type. 
In November, 1990, the road pricing proposals were rejected, and replaced by a plan to 
install some 20 to 25 toll stations on interurban roads. The proposals for the tolling 
system were announced in December 1990 as a government response to the original 
Transport Structure Plan. This response was based upon extensive consultation with the 
public groups, motorist organisations andinter-governmental think-tanks. The statement 
included the following: 
Tolls 
Tolls, conventional or electronic, are to be introduced in mid 1994 on a number of access 
roads, tunnels and bridges in and around the Randstad. In this way resources will be 
gathered for use in implementing policy while at the same time achieving some measure 
of traffic restraint. 
Peak-hour surcharge 
If tolls cannot be implemented quickly enough the Government intends introducing an 
interim measure in the form of a peak-hour surcharge on the annual vehicle tax for cars 
used in the morning rush hour, coupled with a discount for those not so used. Ways are 
being examined of making the surcharge as flexible as possible, i.e. payable by the 
motorist in respect of periods determined by him or her (one month, one week, even one 
day). 
.. . 
The purpose of these various pricing measures is to adjust the relative cost to the user of 
public transport and the private car in public transport's favour. They are not intended 
to affect freight transport and ways are being considered of achieving this. An 
investigation is also underway into the extent to which those who make little use of the 
car can be spared the effect of the price measures. 
4.2 Objectives 
The current proposals for tolling in the Randstad, as set out in the Second Transport 
Structure Plan, are set within a broad range of policy measures. The objectives for the toll 
system, conventional or electronic, are set out in policy category 2, managing and 
restraining mobility, policy area 12, pricing policy. The toll system is regarded primarily 
as a means of raising revenue from 1994 onwards to finance access roads, tunnels and 
bridges in and around the Randstad and also a means of achieving some measure of 
traffic restraint. There are no specific target reductions for the toll system, rather a 
general target reduction for car use in 2010 from 70% above 1986 levels to 50% above, and 
subsequently to 35% above, which will require a package of policy measures. This differs 
from the 1988 structure plan which defined specific target reductions for electronic road 
pricing. 
4.3 Monitoring Proposals 
As part of the original road pricing proposals for the Randstad a number of assessment 
studies were carried out to assess a range of possible effects. Some of these assessment 
studies are relevant to the tolling system, although further studies and repeat work are 
to be carried out as part of the proposals. The majority of the monitoring/assessment 
work has been related to individual traveller response. The assessment studies have 
included direct observation of traffic diversion in situations where toll-charges have been 
introduced for new tunnel schemes and stated preference studies where travellers are 
presented with a range of levels of charge and resulting conditions to assess possible 
reactions to a range of hypothetical charging scenarios. 
" 
A survey to assess public attitudes to alternative ways of specifying a user-charging 
system was completed in December 1990. Discussions are underway to extend this work. 
Whilst there has been no formal monitoring of media reaction, it has been found over the 
period between 1988-1990 that the media have in general objected to measures to restrict 
car-usage and have publicised the adverse effects which would be imposed on particular 
types of traveller, eg the infrequent traveller. 
hi attempt has been made to model the effects of a road-user charge scheme on 
employment using data from the National Travel Survey and the National Bureau of 
Statistics. There were many analytical problems encountered with this study, and the 
results found little evidence for effects on employment. Interview surveys to assess the 
possible effects on freight operators have been carried out although the questions posed 
were found to be too vague and remote to the operators. A second series of interviews 
involving questions about specific routes and charges is being considered. 
Work on the effects of road user charges on residential location in the Rotterdam area has 
been undertaken as part of on-going work by the Dutch Economic Institute. There is a 
proposal to extend this work further. The initial evidence suggested that road user 
charges would have some effect on residential location. 
- .  
Alongside the modelling of effects on employment, some analysis on the distributional 
effects of road user charges across income groups was tested. Here too the analysis was 
troubled by a number of data problems, and produced counter-intuitive findings with 
lower income groups apparently being willing to pay as much as higher income groups. 
A task force has been set up to continue to assess the technical and practical aspects of 
the tolling-system proposals including location of toll-booths, administration of the system 
and enforcement. 
Finally the possible effects of toll charges on overall tr&c levels, the environment and 
safety have been examined. The National Travel Model has been run with a two-level 
pricing structure to assess overall traffic effects. Attempts have been made to find out the 
safety record of tolled-roads and non-tolled roads in other countries - notably France and 
the USA but without much success. 
The original proposals for road pricing were assessed for their effects on a range of 
pollution emissions &om cars and from heavy goods vehicles including carbon dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides. 
In sum the proposals for user-charges in the Randstad have been assessed, to varying 
degrees of detail and success, against all of the major headings (a) - (i) outlined in Section 
3.5. 
4.4 Summary 
The Dutch have done more work than others to predict and analyse the effects of road 
pricing, and it  may well be of value to LPAC to have access to the results of this work, 
much of which is currently only available in Dutch and some of which is as yet 
incomplete. In particular, the stated preference work conducted by The MVA Consultancy 
could usefully complement that which NED0 plan to collect. 
However, the abrupt change in policy in December 1990 makes future work in the 
Randstad less relevant to London. The system now proposed is both simpler than any 
scheme envisaged for London, and located away from the urban centres, where impacts 
on mode and time of day choice, and on congestion patterns, will be markedly different. 
The experience leading up to this policy change may well be of direct relevance in 
determining the acceptability of road pricing in London. It is clear that, rather as in Houg 
Kong, technological development had outstripped the process of opinion-forming. Public 
attitudes were inadequately understood, and the individual political parties had differing 
preferences among the possible measures. It  is interesting to note that none of the main 
political parties was arguing against some form of charging for car use, but even this 
consensus was insufficient. It may be that a more detailed assessment of the relative 
merits of alternative charging systems would have helped. 
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5 STOCKHOLM 
5.1 History and Current Status 
A traffic bill outlining proposals for traffic and environmental management in Stockholm 
was signed by the major political parties governing the Stockholm area in January 1991. 
The proposal included a fee system for vehicles entering the city. The system proposed 
would require all motorists to purchase a tagged licence which allows a vehicle to enter 
the central area of Stockholm. Violation of the scheme triggers a video monitoring 
structure, mounted on an  overhead gantry which records the number plate at  the rear 
of the vehicle. Detected vehicles are fined £25. The location of the gantries and the fee 
structure has yet to be decided. The fee system is intended to vary by time of day and by 
type of vehicle. 
This system, similar in  many respects to the current operation in Oslo, follows extensive 
discussion of alternative approaches to dealing with traffic congestion in Stockholm. An 
earlier system based on prepurchased licences, as used in Singapore, which was tested on 
a trial basis, and had the initial support of the committee of politicians looking at  
alternative solutions, was found to work well in terms of the ability to detect vehicles 
violating the svstem. The ~rouosed svstem of area tolls would have consisted of the area 
within the old city walls (tde so-calledinner traffic area) extending approximately 5-6 km. 
from the city centre, with a number of exce~tions relatingin the main to strategic through 
access and erdt routes. Tolls would have operated ~ o n r ~ h u r s d a y  from ~ a m - 6 ~ m  and i n  
Fridays from 7am to 4pm. No tolls would be payable in July. Two types of card would 
have been available - an individual monthly card (£30), coupled with a right to use the 
Regional Public Transport System, and a daily card (£2.50). Registered disabled drivers, 
emergency service vehicles and electric and other environmentally acceptable vehicles 
would have been exempt. Politicians outside the committee however opposed the system 
on.  a variety of grounds including possible forgeiy of licences and the costs and 
practicalities of monitoring a city-wide licensing scheme. 
The current agreement has been reached as a result of a decision by the government in 
April 1990 to appoint a negotiator for each Metropolitan Region to present proposals for 
significantly improved traffic systems. The team of negotiators helped to minimise the 
conflict between political representatives and to educate politicians about the range of 
solutions available and the benefits of different sets of solutions. 
The timetable for the introduction of the system is unknown, though the agreement on 
the overall traffic strategy for Stockholm covers the period 1991-2005. The agreement 
includes specification of investments in both public and private transport, some of which 
would be paid for from revenues generated from the fee system. These have been 
calculated at  13,900 million SOK (£1390m), from 1997 if agreement on the fee system is 
reached in 1992, and the necessary legislation is then forthcoming. 
5.2 Objectives 
The original proposals for road pricing were part of an overall transport strategy for the 
Metropolitan area of Stockholm which was designed to achieve a reduction in air pollution 
and traffic noise and to reduce road congestion. The strategy, including a combination of 
public transport investments, car tolls and road improvements, was predicted to be able 
to reduce vehicle mileage by 30-40% and increase public transport speeds by 30%. 
There are however no clearly stated objectives or targets, either for trfic restraint or 
environmental improvemeiits, in the licensing agreement reached. Rather the primary 
objective now for the licensing system is revenue-generation, the revenue generated being 
essential to the development of new private and public transport investment necessary 
to improve the city's transport system and to gain the support of the different political 
parties. However in contrast to the schemes in Norway, the Swedish government has 
made it clear that it will not sanction road pricing to generate funds for road building 
unless it can be shown that these will improve the environment. 
5.3 Monitoring Proposa'ls 
Discussions and proposals for some form of tr&c restraint involving user charges have 
taken place in Stockholm since the mid-1970s. A number of investigations have been 
conducted to assess the overall costs and benefits of an area licensing scheme. Since then 
the main assessment work has been on individual traveller response using a revealed 
preference model based upon data from the 1986187 National Travel Survey. The results 
of this analysis, of which little has been written up, indicated little or no reduction in the 
number of work trips but some effect on shopping trip destinations. There have been a 
range of figures quoted on the possible overall traffic reduction at  different charging 
levels. Based on the 1986187 data for example it has been predicted that a daily charge 
of E2.50Iday would reduce traffic by 10%. Other calculations have suggested a licence of 
E30lmonth would reduce overall traffic by between 6-8% per day. Simple studies, based 
upon the net traffic reduction figures above, have been carried out in the past to assess 
the energy, environmental and financial implications of the licensing scheme. 
A sum of £200,000 had been set aside to monitor the effects of the earlier proposals for 
a manual 'pay and display' scheme. The main aspect of this monitoring was to have been 
zonal traffic flow counts within the central area. Some monitoring of public transport 
patronage was to have taken place, although the details of what form this would have 
taken were never advanced. The study was to have included comparisons with other 
metropolitan areas without traffic restraint. Stockholm University was to have conducted 
a separate study examining the effects of the scheme on retail activity in the city. 
The monitoring proposals for the latest area licensing scheme are unclear. It is not clear 
whether the £200,000 from the previous proposal will be made available for the current 
proposal. A view expressed during the visit was that monitoring the physical effects of 
the system would be less important than monitoring public and political attitudes towards 
the system. Compared to our list of monitoring requirements outlined in Section 3.5, 
Stockholm has tended to focus on the scale of traveller response, mainly through observed 
counts of vehicular flows. There has been considerable debate and discussion about the 
proposals to work out a proposal which people could agree on including discussions with 
retailers, employers and freight operators. The impacts of the proposals on these sectors 
have not however been formally quantified or appraised. 
5.4 Summary 
The proposals for Stockholm are gradually becoming firmer, but there is still no definite 
date for implementation, and the precise defmition of the scheme, including charging 
levels and locations, still has to be finalised. Implementation seems unlikely before 1993 
at the earliest. 
.. . 
There is, however, an interest in the issues of concern in London, and a commitment to 
conduct a monitoring exercise, for which a budget had been allocated. There was a 
positive reaction to the suggestion of using Stockholm as a test-bed for further assessment 
studies of interest to the London proposals. It does appear, therefore, that the 
opportunity could be taken to develop a joint monitoring programme in Stockholm which 
would help to answer outstandiilg issues in London. 

6 OSLO 
6.1 History and Current Status 
A toll ring was introduced around Oslo on 1 Febiuary 1990 comprising a watertight 
cordon of 17 toll gates some 8-10 km from the central area, (Figure I), where inbound 
traffic is charged at all times. A similar ring has been in operation around Bergen since 
1 January 1986 but with tolls restricted to the working day between 6am - 10pm. The 
location of the toll gates in both cities is based on practical and political considerations. 
Both systems were introduced with the sole aim of generating funds for majoi- road 
investment without affecting the amount of traffic entering the city. For this reason toll 
charges were set at a relatively low level; 10 Kroner ( E l )  for cars, 20 Kroner for trucks. 
Seasonal passes may be purchased which allow an unlimited number of trips to be made, 
at 2200 Kroner per year, or 200 Kroner per month for cars. These charges rose by 30% 
in February 1991. Since December 1990 an electronic toll system has operated. The 
possibility of introducing a charging structure which varies by time of day is being 
discussed. 
6.2 Objectives 
The Oslo and Bergen toll rings were introduced with the sole objective of raising revenue 
to finance new roads and, to a less& extent, public transport. 
6.3 Monitoring Proposals 
An extensive monitoring of the effects of the Oslo toll-ring system is currently underway. 
This work is being carried out through the Oslo Institute of Transport Economics. A total 
of around £600,000 has been made available to monitor the effects of the system. The 
majority of the work being carried out, and which will be reported by the end of the 
summer, is concerned with individual traveller response and overall traffic levels. 
Two surveys have been carried out to identify the response of individual travellers to the 
toll charges. The first is a postal return questionnaire involving 20,000 sets of responses 
to a long list of questions including amount of travel, method of travel, trip destination 
and time of travel. A second survey based upon a telephone questionnaire has been 
carried out involving 3,500 respondents. This survey is part of a longitudinal study 
(previous survey data 1977, 1985) to examine mainly patterns of work trips and mode 
choice. In addition an interview survey has been carried out on 1,000 respondents prior 
to and after the system introduction to ascertain general attitudes to the system of 
charges. The after survey has found little change in attitudes to the toll-system; in both 
surveys 66% of respondents were opposed to the system. The survey results will assess 
the distributional effects of the changes. 
Compared against the list of monitoring requirements in para Section 3.5, there has been 
no investigation of the effects of the system on freight operators, residential location, 
retail turnover, other land-use effects or environmental implications. 
The early findings from the traffic count data, before and after the toll system was 
introduced, indicate the somewhat surprising result that traffic flows have increased at 
all but three of the toll sites, with no effect on vehicle occupancies. 
Fi y r e  1: Toll sites in Oslo. 
6.4 Summary 
The Oslo scheme is unusual in that it involves a single cordon on the outskirts of the city, 
with a low charge which does not vary throughout the 24 hour day (although discussions 
are underway to introduce variable charging). It can be expected to have little impact on 
congestion and, becuase it is designed to raise revenue, offers few alternatives to the 
motorist. As such it will provide only limited experience of relevance to London. 
However, discussions are underway on the possibility of introducing time-dependent 
charges. 
Having said this, the scheme has the largest monitoring budget of any of the schemes 
studied. It should be possible at  least to learn from this something of the distributional 
effects of the charge and the difTerences in level of response for different types of journey 
purpose, at different times of day. 
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7 SINGAPORE 
7.1 History and Current Status 
In 1975 the government introduced an area licensing scheme (ALS) in Singapore with the 
aim of changing the travel habits of the pi-ivate motoiist. The intention was to reduce the 
inefficient use of private cars in the city ceiitre during peak hours, but without damaging 
the economic health of the central area. A cordon was drawn around the central business 
district and commercial area of the city, and car entry was restricted during peak hours 
to those vehicles displaying a special licence on their windscreen. Initially the restriction 
applied between 0730-0930, but was quickly extended to 1015 when it was seen that a 
large number of drivers were delaying their journey until just after the 0930 deadline. In 
June 1989 the scheme was extended to include the evening peak period between 1700- 
1900. Daily or monthly licences may be purchased from a variety of outlets. Initial cost 
was S$3 a day (approximately £2). 
The scheme was designed to reduce congestion without reducing the vital activity of the 
city. Most goods vehicles were exempt from the licence, as were cars carrying 4 or more 
passengers (including the driver). At the same time company cars were charged twice the 
private car rate, and taxis 40% of the piivate rate. Since vehicles are not required to stop 
when entering the restricted zone, traffic flow is not impeded. Enforcement of the schemes 
comes from roadside surveillance by police, and manned booths on each of the 25 road 
entrances into the zone where the number plate of licence violators is recorded and a fine 
later sent by post. 
There have been eight sets of changes made since the ALS started on 2 June 1975, 
relating to exempt vehicles, periods of operation, charges and extensions of the ALS area. 
The last package of changes was announced in May 1989 and was implemented between 
1 June and 1 December 1989. The area was extended again, exemptions reduced and car 
fees reduced. All vehicles except publicly-owned buses, must now pay as follows (daily 
charge): cars S$3 (down from S$5), taxis S$3 (up from S$2), company cars S$6 @$lo). 
Motorcycles and other vehicles, including trucks, now pay S$l  and S$3 respectively. 
Monthly licences are also available. Car pools are no longer exempt because of concern 
over abuse. A day licence is valid for the whole of the day, so a car could enter on it in 
the morning and again in the evening. The reduction in charges for cars was not as a 
prelude to electronic road pricing (ERP) but because, when exemptions were eliminated, 
the govenunent did not want to appear to be doing it to make money, which has never 
been an objective of ALS. Petrol piices and car parking charges were raised in May and 
August 1990 respectively. 
The periods of operation of ALS are now Monday to Saturday 0730 to 1015 and Monday 
to Friday 1630 to 1830. Licences are required inbound in both morning and evening. 
Evening hours were originally 1630 to 1900 but a parliamentary hearing changed this to 
the present hours. The extension of the hours and vehicle classes is said to be a result 
of increasing affluence and vehicle ownership and the more concentrated nature of the 
evening peak. 
A vehicle quota system was introduced on 1 May 1990. Potential buyers of new vehicles 
bid for a Certificate of Entitlement (CoE). All bids in a particular month are compared 
with the government's "allowance" for that month (n). The n highest bidders receive 
COEs and all pay a cost equal to the lowest successful bid (the "quota premium"). A CoE 
.. . 
is valid for 10 years from a vehicle's registration. The CoE is sold with the vehicle. When 
the CoE expires, the owner may buy a new one, without having to bid, at the prevailing 
quota premium. 
Car purchase is expensive: the Customs Department determines market value and to this 
is added a 45% impoi-t duty. There is also a S$1000 registration fee and a further 150% 
registration fee of the price (plus import duty). The buyer must also pay the quota 
premium. 
Though motorists do not like paying, they now generally accept ALS but dislike the 
controls on ownership through quotas and taxes. Generally, only the most senior people 
get any company help towards restraint costs, so they fall on the individual. The 
government has always maintained that it is only interested in controlling vehicle use 
when and where congestion occui-s. Though congestion is not great at the peaks by 
normal standards, it does occur. However, lack of off-peak congestion appears to underly 
the dislike of the quotas and taxes on ownership. This has led to the Weekend Car 
Scheme to be introduced probably in May 1991. Cars used only at  the weekend will be 
around S$15000 cheaper than normal cars, with 30% less road tax. 
Despite the growing demand for vehicles, the government feels able to maintain restraint 
and road pricing because:- 
(a) public transport is good, with frequent bus services, bus priorities and the mass 
rapid transit (MRT); 
(b) i t  has never been linked to revenue generation; 
(c) its beneficial results can be seen; 
(d) transport policy for 15-20 years has presented the same mixed package and the 
benefits of the whole are also visible; 
(e) the government's apparent willingness to respond to public concern (the 
introduction of the Weekend Car scheme and some changes to the ALS are cited 
as examples of this); 
(0 the greater amount of control possible in a small city state. 
An upgrading to electronic road pricing is now seen as a natural progression &om ALS 
with the benefits of being more flexible and less labour intensive. Bids are currently 
being evaluated. Detector loops will register the electronic identity of a "box" on the 
vehicle. The motorist will buy the vehicle box, for about S$50. All vehicles which use the 
ALS area including motorcycles must have one. They will be billed. Publicly-owned buses 
will have boxes (they might help bus operations) but will not be billed. Violators will be 
photographed automatically and fined (if they have no "box"). Illegally changing the 
vehicle's electronic ID will be detected by the emergence of large bills or because two 
vehicles with the same ID could be detected by time and place of crossing the loops. 
Initially, the scheme will have 25 loop stations, one a t  each entrance to the ALS area, and 
will operate roughly as ALS does now. Later it is likely to be modifed perhaps to vary 
charges more progressively with time of day: for example to help reduce the "mini-peaks" 
now occuring just before and after ALS periods. 
It  is likely that it will be extended later in area: an  island-wide scheme appears to be 
under general consideration though it  is not yet policy. 
.. - 
A demonstration project (say, two points) should be operating by the end of 1991. A 
further 18 months will then be needed to complete the 25 points. The ERP will probably 
initially operate in parallel with the ALS, mainly to test it, without sending out bills. 
The charge is as yet unknown, but may initially be similar to ALS. Elasticities have been 
looked at without success, so trial and error will feature. Public Works will have the 
results of a speedlflow study commissioned from Nanyang Institute of Technology which 
will at  least allow them to relate desired speeds to the volumes to be allowed into the 
area. 
. ., 7.2 Objectives 
In the early 1970s Singapore was trying to attract investment. Early signs of congestion 
had appeared and congestion was seen as a potential deterrent to investment and growth, 
by ruling politicians. A working group was set up about 1973 to propose effective 
alternative proposals. An area licensing scheme (ALS) was one of the several and 
potentially the most effective. It was presented to the prime minister, who canvassed 
political views before requesting its implementation. About a year was allowed for prior 
publicity and discussion. It was thus not a scheme to reduce congestion per se, concerned 
at the same time not to damage the economic health of the central area, but had as its 
underlying goal the creation of growth. Since 1975, employment is said to have risen by 
about one third in the ALS area. 
Policy is founded on the 1967-71 Land Use Transport Study; all other plans have been 
developed within this. Policy has been to make areas of development as self-contained 
as possible, to reduce travel. Transport policy has been composed consistently of four 
equally important components: 
1 Moderate road building: a network of high capacity roads to link main areas and 
to provide a basic network within them, and to complete "missing links". Most 
new city roads in the current 10 year roads programme will be underground, due 
to lack of space; 
2 Traffic management; 
3 Public transport improvement: more buses, bus lanes, MRT; 
4 Traffic restraint. 
This has always been presented as a mixed package: there is no reliance solely on any one 
element. Revenues from transport (including S$33 million from ALS) go to the general 
exchequer and are not earmarked for transport schemes. 
Control (not ownership) of the entire parking system has 'ecently come under Public 
Works and is now being linked more with other policy areas. 
About S$200 million will be spent in the next 3 years on the pedestrian system, including 
better surfaces, disabled facilities and tree planting. 
7.3 Monitoring Proposals 
The Singapore government, the World Bank, the United Nations Environmental Program 
and the United States Department of Transportation were all involved in monitoring the 
effects of the area licensing scheme in Singapore. The year long run-up to the introduction 
of the scheme allowed a variety of measures to be taken before implementation and 
ensured a substantial database against which to monitor the impact of the scheme. Data 
recorded both before and at  several points after the introduction of the scheme have 
included (Watson and Holland 1976): 
a) Vehicle flows - types of vehicle, time of day, location and car occupancy levels. 
b) Vehicle speeds - while vehicle flow data allowed an "at a glance" statement on the 
changes in the number of vehicles entering the restricted zone, vehicle speed 
measurements provided a better indication of level of congestion. 
c) Household and business interviews - over 2000 households (1500 of whom were car 
owners) were interviewed both before and 4-6 months after the introduction of the 
scheme. From these data general changes in travel mode were assessed. A smaller 
sample of 719 households were used to examine changes in home to work trips. 
Business interviews appear to have comprised an unspecified number of interviews 
with local businessmen concerning the impact of the scheme on local trade. 
In addition, a series of surveys of conditions for pedestrians and of public opinion were 
conducted (McGlynn and Roberts, 1977a,b; Roberts, 1977). 
In addition to this monitoring work, the Public Works Department carries out 6-monthly 
traffic flow counts, mainly at the ALS area boundary and some journey timeispeed surveys 
in the ALS area in order to monitor congestion. The results are for internal use and are 
not published. Apart from the work described below no further collection of information 
on the ALS is contemplated. The equity problems near the boundary and the transfer of 
congestion to routes outside are acknowledged and "lived with". Some land use effects 
were noted, but were considered to be comparatively minor. 
What monitoring has taken place suggests speeds have increased in ALS hours, there is 
more congestion on the ring-road outside the ALS area and there has been a shift to 
public transport. But this was in a period of public transport improvement, too. In the 
late 1980's speeds were: 
morning peak afternoon peak 
In ALS area 
Outside ALS area 
A 6000 household Household Interview survey was carried out in 1988 to calibrate the 
UTPS land use transport model. A further survey (of 6000 households) will be carried out 
in 1991, including 1000 of the previous households. The 1991 survey will be undertaken 
with the assistance of Peter Jones of Oxford and an Australian individual consultant. 
They are interested in the vehicle ownership/vehicle use relationship in the context of the 
restraint policies. The 1988 survey can be used as a base against which to set the 1991 
survey. Between these dates the quota system, weekend cars and evening ALS will have 
been introduced. The survey will be complete in May or June 1991. The proposed 
questionnaire is mostly standard except: 
(a) it covers two days of travel and 
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(b) it has additional questions on 'estraint, including the effect of evening ALS, the 
impact of the quota system, the demand for weekend cars and whether the change 
from ALS to ERP will cause a change in habits. 
No monitoring of items other those those currently monitored for the ALS is envisaged a t  
this stage for the Electronic Road Pricing proposals, and no monitoring team exists as 
such. Monitoring of speeds and flows will continue, presumably linked to any changes in  
the fee. Flows can presumably be continously monitored, a t  least during "billable" times, 
by vehicle class, using the loops. 
The Public Works Department are aware of all the issues and main objections relating to 
ERP which are listed in Section 3, and all have been voiced to some degree in  Singapore. 
However to study or survey them, would, they argue, draw undue public attention to 
them. The ERP will be appropriately packaged by a PR company when presented to the 
public, as is increasingly common with Singapore transport policies. 
Given the prior existence of the ALS, its general acceptance (albeit grudging) by the public 
and the initial similarity of ERP to it, major problems of acceptance are not anticipated. 
7.4 Summary 
The Singapore ALS scheme has already provided substantial information on the effects 
of road pricing. It appears that the electronic road pricing scheme will not be sufficiently 
different in its impact to provide significant new information on the overall effects of road 
pricing. The main interest, for London, would lie in obtaining answers to some of the 
more detailed issues raised i n  Section 3, but it is clear that  the Public Works Department, 
while aware of these issues, consider it potentially counter-productive to investigate them 
pubicly. It must also be borne in. mind that the nature of the Singapore society and 
economy would make such results difficult to transfer. On this basis, it appears that 
developments in  Singapore will be more interesting for the experience gained with the 
technology than with user response and travel patterns. 
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Current Status of Road Pricing Proposals 
In the six months since this study was commissioned, the status of two of the proposals 
has changed significantly. The proposals for ERP in the Randstadt have been abandoned, 
and replaced by a simpler toll system on interurban roads. The original area licensing 
proposals for Stockholm have been replaced by a less fully specified proposal for semi- 
automated toll points. In both cases, the changes have resulted from political differences 
over the best way of charging road users, rather than from any basic reluctance to charge 
for the use of congested road space. 
The Oslo system of semi-automated tolls was already in operation a t  the time that the 
study was commissioned, but there have since been suggestions that the charging 
structure might be modified to one which varies by time of day. The Singapore area 
licensing scheme was last changed in 1989, but has since been accompanied by increased 
taxes on car ownership. Plans to replace ALS by an ERP system are well advanced. 
While not within the original brief, the opportunity was taken briefly to review the new 
proposals for congestion pricing in Cambridge, which will involve an in-vehicle congestion 
meter, which imposes a charge only when pre-specified levels of congestion are 
experienced. 
This rapid rate of change in both existing and proposed road user charging systems 
indicates the high level of interest in the subject currently, but also the considerable 
political sensitivity of the subject. This concern over political issues coloured all of our 
discussions on opportunities for monitoring. 
8.2 Objectives of the Proposals 
It  was clear in our discussions that the objectives of some of the proposals had changed 
or, at least, that the objectives were now being less firmly stated, with fewer specific 
achievement targets. This change, too, appears to have been a response to the heightened 
political sensitivity of the measures. Table 8.1 summarises our best understanding of the 
current objectives of the exisitng schemes and proposals. 
The Randstadt proposals still focus on congestion relief, environmental protection and 
sustainability, and on revenue generation. However, the emphasis on revenue raising 
appears to have increased, particularly in  response to the need to obtain the support of 
motorists. At the same time, there has been an increased emphasis on the practicability 
of the system and, in response to public criticism, on public acceptability. 
The Stockholm proposals are still primarily focused on environmental protection and 
issues of sustainability. However, here too revenue raising has become a more dominant 
issue, as have concerns over practicability and acceptability. 
The Oslo system was introduced specifically to raise revenue for new infrastructure, and 
was established as a simple, practical system which could be later enhanced. It was 
introduced in the expectation, based on experience in Bergen, that it would be broadly 
accepted. Public concern at  the inequities which it introduces has, however, increased the 
emphasis on ensuring that any modifications increase public acceptability. 
The Singapore system was primarily designed to relieve congestion, improve accessibility, 
and hence foster economic growth. These objectives remain, although there has been some 
increase in concern over environmental issues. The proposed change to ERP is primarily 
justified in terms of practical concerns over enforcement and administration. 
Table 8.1 
Policv Objectives for Road Pricing in Randstadt, Stockholm. Oslo and S i n r a w r e  $ 
Randstadt Stockholm - Oslo Sineauore 
Economic growtWrevitalisation * C 
Efficiency/congestion relief * * 
Accessibility 
Environmental protection and 
improved quality of travel * 
Revenue generation * 
Safety 
Equity 
Practicability * e 
Sustainability z * F 
Acceptability * * * t 
The different objectives and scheme characteristics have immediate implications for the k+ 
relevance bf experience with them to London. The revised Randstadt proposals, involving 
toll points on interurban roads, have little relevance to London, even though their 
objectives are close to those of policy in London. Similarly, the Oslo system, which is 
designed primarily to raise revenue, and uses toll points on the periphery of the city, with 
C 
little opportunity for toll avoidance, is not closely comparable, even though i t  may produce 
some relevant experience on user response. 
The systems which are closest in design to that proposed for London are those in 
Stockholm and Singapore. Of these, the Stockholm proposals have the more directly 
comparable objectives, and are to be implemented in a city in which the mix of modes is 
more similar. 
8.3 Opportunities for Monitoring a n d  Assessment 
I 
I11 reviewing the requirements for monitoring and assessment of road user charging 
proposals in London, we identified the following information needs: 
I 
(a) The scale of traveller response 
(b) General public and media attitudelperception 
- 
I 
(c) The scale of employers' resDonse 
32 
(d) The scale of freight operators' response 
(e) The scale of land-use response 
(0 The systems implications 
(g) The equity implications 
fh)  The practical considerations 
(i) Implications for the environment 
Further details are given in Section 3.5. 
We used this list as a basis for our discussions in the case study cities. Table 8.2 
summarises the information which we gleaned on issues already assessed or to be 
monitored in each city. 
In the Randstad, virtually all the items of interest have been assessed predictively, with 
the exception of employers' response. Some difficulty was experienced, however, with the 
prediction of land use effects. I t  can be expected that most of these issues will be 
considered also in the monitoring of any system which is eventually implemented. While, 
as noted above, the measures proposed are likely to be very different from those envisaged 
for London, they should still provide useful experience generally on user response. Those 
responsible are enthusiastic to share their experience, and it  would be well worth 
maintaining contact as their proposals for monitoring develop. More immediately, it would 
be valuable to gain access to the predictive work which they have already conducted. 
In Stockholm, less detailed predictive work has been conducted, and the intentions for 
monitoring are less clear. However, a budget has been allocated, and those responsible are 
very willing to collaborate in any monitoring proposals. Moreover, as noted above, the 
scheme proposed is the most similar in nature, objectives and context to that for London. 
Stockholm therefore offers the best opportunity for collaborative development of the 
monitoring and assessment of road user charges. At the time of our visit, those 
responsible were uncertain of their precise monitoring ulans, so we did not iudee it 
" - 
appropriate to discuss funding and management of such; collaborative exercise in detail. 
However, we recommend that such discussions be held in the near future. 
In Oslo, the assessment and monitoring has focused on user response, public attitudes and 
overall traffic levels. There has been little study as yet of organisational or land use 
responses, or of equity or environmental issues. The project has a substantial monitoring 
budget, most of which has been allocated. Those responsible would however welcome an 
input of additional finance which could be directed to issues of concern to London. 
However, the scheme is markedly different in nature, and it  is probably only the 
information on user response and attitudes which will be of direct relevance. 
In Singapore, virtually all of the issues of concern have been addressed in the past 15 
years, as part of the worldwide interest in what was until recently the only operational 
road pricing system. The ERP proposals are likely to be very similar in their impact to the 
current ALS system, and will therefore produce little new information, except on the 
technological pei-formance of the new system. Moreover, those responsible judge that it 
will not be necessary to conduct significant further monitoring; while they appreciate the 
importance of the issues raised in our report they judge it  better not to explore them in 
detail in a city which has broadly accepted the ALS measures. There is thus little 
opportunity for further lessons from Singapore, except on the technology as it develops. 
Table 8.2 . 
Monitoring and  Assessment of Road Pricing 
Randstad. Stockholm, Oslo and  Singapore 
Randstad Stockholm Singapore 
Scale of traveller resuonse 
- amount of travel * * * * 
- origin and destination of travel * * 
- time of travel * * * 
- mode used * * * * 
- nwnber and composition of 
vehicle occupants * * * 
- route used * * 
- time spent at destination 
- parking location 
General public and media attitude 
- motorists affected * 
- other motorists * 
- non-motorists affected * 
Scale of emplovers' response * 
Freight ouerators resuonse 
Scale of land-use response 
Svstem implications 
- average journey speeds 
- total travel times 
- waitldelay times 
- total vehicle km 
Equitv implications 
Practical considerations 
Implications for the environment 
* = effect assessed or monitored 
8.4 Other  Lessons for London 
Discussions with others who were directly involved in the task of implementing road user 
charging proved useful in highlighting lessons for the introduction of similar measures in 
London. 
The first message was the need to keep the specification of the objectives and of the 
measures themselves simple and straightforward. This included concern not to overspecify 
.. . 
the likely benefits of road user charging, while at the same time emphasising the benefits, 
and the positive rather than negative attributes of the proposals. 
The second was the importance of continued consultation with all of those who might be 
affected, both positively and negatively, by the proposals, as well as with all the political 
parties and central and local government bodies who might be involved in decision 
making. It was generally recognised that this would be a lengthy and demanding process. 
The third was the need, despite the general requirement for simplicity, to specify precisely 
how the revenue would be used. It is clear, as others have argued (Goodwin, 1989), that 
being able to offer some contribution to residents, some to public transport users and some 
to motorists themselves helped to make potentially unattractive meaures more palatable. 
The final message was the importance of retaining flexibility in the scheme once 
implemented, so that it could be easily implemented, and later adjusted to overcome 
unpredicted problems. This is an approach which, more than any other, has explained the 
success of the Singapore scheme. 
Within this context, the role of assessment and monitoring is perhaps somewhat limited. 
There is a danger that further analysis is used as an excuse for not making progress on 
the implementation of the measure. Once a commitment has been made to proceed, 
predictive assessment, or experience &om elsewhere, is particularly valuable in answering 
questions, allaying concerns and modifying the proposals. However, it should not be used 
as a basis for delaying progress, since it is clear that the most direct experience is gained 
from implementation, and that that experience is likely to differ from scheme to scheme 
and from city to city. Once an initial scheme has been implemented, a monitoring 
programme will be of greater benefit in enabling adverse side effects to be identified and 
eliminated. Such a programme for London, and the pre-implementation data against 
which it will be compared, should be based on the information requirements listed in 
Section 3.5. 
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